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Servnet Research · Oil, energy and IT costs · 2026

Oil prices, the 2026 conflict involving Iran and the cost of IT: UK, US and EU price data since 1996

We tested 93 official UK, US and EU price series against oil, and measured what has moved since the conflict involving Iran began on 28 February 2026: IT hardware prices, freight, materials, energy and the cost of running IT.

+27.8%
Brent monthly average, February to August 2026 (World Bank); in April it was +69.3% on February
−1.8%
UK import prices for computer, electronic and optical products over the same months (ONS)
+23.9%
UK other transport support services incl. freight forwarding, 2026 Q2 on Q1: the largest quarterly rise since 1996 (ONS)
47.5–67.9%
of UK IT import value arrived by air in 2025 (HMRC), against 33.2% for all goods

Updated 19 September 2026 · ONS, DESNZ, HMRC, BLS, Eurostat and World Bank data; conflict timeline sourced to official bodies and news reports · method and dataset below

Summary

What this study found

This study tests whether the rise in oil prices after the conflict involving Iran began on 28 February 2026 has reached what UK organisations pay for IT. It uses open official data: 93 price series from the UK, US and EU, eight oil price episodes since 2008, HMRC trade records and DESNZ energy prices. Between February and August 2026 the Brent monthly average (World Bank) rose 27.8%, but UK import and consumer price indices for IT equipment did not rise with it; over samples starting in 1996 or 2009, three IT hardware indices show no detectable link with oil. Fuel prices, UK plastics and aluminium producer prices and 3 of 16 freight and transport price series show a robust link with oil. In 2026 Q2, UK freight-related transport support prices (SPPI H5229) had their largest quarterly rise since the series began in 1996. Producer prices for computers rose, coinciding with the rise in memory-chip prices. The study makes no forecasts. It sets out what has moved, what has not, and what IT budget holders can check.

Naming: this study refers to “the conflict involving Iran (from 28 February 2026)”. It reports dated, sourced events that matter for energy, shipping and IT, without casualty figures or attribution of blame. It makes no forecasts and gives no investment advice.

Key findings

What moved, what did not, and how sure we are

Each finding carries a grade: A is measured directly from official data, B is a robust statistical estimate, B-null a precisely estimated absence of a link, A-confounded a measured change that overlaps a non-oil driver, C suggestive.
  1. AUK import and consumer price indices for IT equipment did not rise with oil in 2026. From February to August 2026 the Brent monthly average (World Bank) rose 27.8%, while UK import prices for computer, electronic and optical products changed −1.8% and UK consumer prices for information processing equipment were 2.5% lower in August than a year earlier.
    Source: ONS (OGL v3.0); World Bank Pink Sheet (CC BY 4.0).
  2. A-confoundedProducer prices for computers did rise: UK C262 by 15.2% and US computer and peripheral equipment by 18.1% from February to August 2026. Both began rising before the conflict (C262 +5.6% and US PPI +2.9% in the three months to February 2026); most of the US rise came after April (index 63.4 in April, 74.5 in August). The rises coincide with the rise in memory-chip prices; the vendor statements and filings reviewed cite memory and component costs, and none gives oil or energy as a reason for price increases.
    Source: ONS (OGL v3.0); U.S. BLS (public domain); vendor statements and company filings (SEC EDGAR).
  3. B-nullSince 1996 (since 2009 for UK C26 import prices), three IT hardware price indices show no detectable link with oil: even conservative intervals rule out more than about a 1% move per 10% move in the Brent monthly average for UK C26 import prices (+0.004), US import prices for computers, peripherals and semiconductors (+0.020) and US producer prices for computers (+0.031). For the main consumer IT indices (UK CPI 09.1.3, US CPI computers, and euro-area and EU27 HICP information processing equipment) the data cannot rule out a modest link.
    Source: ONS (OGL v3.0); U.S. BLS (public domain); Eurostat; World Bank (CC BY 4.0).
  4. BFuel prices, UK prices for plastics in primary forms, UK aluminium producer prices and 3 of 16 freight and transport price series (US deep-sea and scheduled air freight, UK road freight) show a robust link with oil. A 10% higher Brent monthly average (World Bank) has been followed within 12 months by about 2.2% higher US producer prices for deep-sea freight (elasticity +0.227, 95% CI +0.131 to +0.323) and about 2.2% higher UK import prices for plastics in primary forms (+0.229, 95% CI +0.119 to +0.340). US air-freight import price indices, US freight transport arrangement, UK cargo handling and UK sea and coastal freight show no detectable link.
    Source: U.S. BLS (public domain); ONS (OGL v3.0); DESNZ (OGL v3.0); World Bank (CC BY 4.0).
  5. AUK producer prices for other transport support services, which include freight forwarding (SPPI H5229), rose 23.9% in 2026 Q2 on the previous quarter, the largest quarterly rise since the series began in 1996. ONS attributes the rise in transport and storage prices mainly to higher shipping rates and fuel charges resulting from the conflict.
    Source: ONS services producer price indices and bulletin of 22 July 2026 (OGL v3.0).
  6. A (2026 prices); C (2021-23 lag)Business electricity had moved little by 2026 Q1, which includes only one month after the conflict began: the average UK non-domestic price was 24.14p/kWh against 23.99p in 2025 Q4, while the GB wholesale system price rose 64.6% from February to August 2026. In 2021-23 the average business price peaked five quarters after the wholesale system price (4-6 quarters across the size bands from Small to Extra Large); that is one episode, affected by government support schemes, and not a forecast.
    Source: DESNZ Quarterly Energy Prices (OGL v3.0); ONS system price (contains BMRS data © Elexon).
  7. ADirect Gulf exposure is small; exposure to air freight is not. 0.95% of UK IT import value in 2025 was dispatched from the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (a lower bound: HMRC records the country of dispatch, not origin), while between 47.5% and 67.9% arrived by air (59.7% of value with a verified mode).
    Source: HMRC Overseas Trade Statistics (OGL v3.0), derived by Servnet.
Timeline

What happened

The conflict involving Iran began on 28 February 2026, the start date used by the IEA and EIA. EIA estimates that oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz fell by about three-quarters between 2025 Q4 and 2026 Q2 (−77.3%), and LNG flows by about 92% (EIA estimates; ship-tracking data unreliable since late February 2026). The Brent monthly average (World Bank) peaked in April 2026 at US$120.4 a barrel, 69.3% above February, and was US$90.9 in August 2026. The timeline lists dated, sourced events that matter for energy, shipping and IT, without casualty figures; attacks are attributed only as the parties or official bodies reported them.

EIA estimate2025-Q12025-Q22025-Q32025-Q42026-Q12026-Q2
Oil through the Strait of Hormuz (million b/d)20.921.021.321.614.94.9
LNG through the Strait of Hormuz (Bcf/d)11.711.010.910.57.40.8
Oil through the Strait of Malacca (million b/d)22.323.823.424.921.316.6

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EIA, STEO Energy Security Data Supplement (Table 2; EIA notes ship-tracking data have been unreliable since late February 2026, and its Malacca detail table gives 24.0 for 2025 Q4). Current status (19 September 2026): The conflict involving Iran that began on 28 February 2026 was continuing in mid-September, with no ceasefire in force (CNBC, 17 Sep; PBS/AP). The 17 June memorandum of understanding broke down in July and its 60-day window ended on 17 August (PBS/AP). The US naval blockade of Iranian ports has been in force again since 14 July (CENTCOM release of 13 July), and the US and Iran exchanged strikes on 30 August and from 1 September (NPR; CNBC). Hormuz traffic: JMIC (Update 096, 13 Sep) recorded 70 US-facilitated transits over 10-12 September (about 23 a day) against a 2025 baseline of about 138 a day, plus 1-10 non-facilitated cargo-vessel and 0-4 tanker transits a day over 6-12 September; ship trackers differ in what they count. Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline, the main Hormuz bypass, was shut on 11 September (JMIC; CNBC); on 14 September PBS/AP reported it would be mostly out of service for several weeks. The IEA says Ras Laffan has been offline since the 2 March attack (IEA topic page, September 2026). The Houthis were reported on 11 September to have taken control of Yemen's Red Sea coast next to Bab el-Mandeb (Al Jazeera; NPR). Seven OPEC+ countries kept October production requirements unchanged (OPEC, 6 Sep). AWS said on 15 September that data held only in its Bahrain Region (me-south-1) or only in the UAE zone mec1-az2 cannot be restored (AWS Health Dashboard).

February 2025 · 1 event
March 2025 · 1 event
April 2025 · 1 event
June 2025 · 6 events
August 2025 · 2 events
September 2025 · 2 events
November 2025 · 2 events
January 2026 · 1 event
February 2026 · 4 events
March 2026 · 24 events
April 2026 · 13 events
May 2026 · 6 events
June 2026 · 7 events
July 2026 · 10 events
August 2026 · 7 events
  • 2 AugPolicySeven OPEC+ countries agreed a 188,000 b/d quota increase for September 2026 (OPEC). CNBC reported that this completed the rollback of the 1.65 million b/d voluntary cut agreed in 2023. (OPEC Secretariat press release, 2 Aug 2026; CNBC, 2 Aug 2026)
  • 9 AugEnergy infrastructureA fire broke out at Saudi Aramco's refinery in Jizan and was extinguished. The Houthis claimed a drone attack on the site. (Al Jazeera, 9 Aug 2026; NPR, 9 Aug 2026; CNBC, 9 Aug 2026)
  • 17 AugPolicyThe 60-day negotiating window under the 17 June MoU ended on 17 August without a final agreement. The US naval blockade remained in force: Al Jazeera reported that the Pentagon had fired on a cargo vessel that week for violating it. (Al Jazeera, 16 Aug 2026; CNBC, 18 Aug 2026; PBS NewsHour, 17 Aug 2026)
  • 24 AugPolicyThe US Treasury announced nearly 60 new Iran-related designations, including tankers and petroleum and petrochemical traders; expanded sector-based designation risk to Iran's aviation, digital-asset, gold, shipping and technology sectors; and suspended several general licences (including those for academic and sports exchanges and personal remittances), with a wind-down licence to 8 September. (US Treasury OFAC, 24 Aug 2026; CNBC, 25 Aug 2026; PBS NewsHour, 28 Aug 2026; PBS NewsHour, Sep 2026)
  • 25 AugShippingIran and Oman discussed, and on 25 August agreed, a temporary shipping route through the Strait of Hormuz and a joint mine-clearing project. The US President said the US Navy had removed all mines from the strait's international waters, and US Central Command said more than 660 million barrels of crude had left Hormuz under its protection since May. Iran said the strait would not fully reopen until the US met its MoU commitments. (CNBC, 25 Aug 2026; Al Jazeera, 26 Aug 2026; PBS NewsHour, 4 Aug 2026 (background only))
  • 26 AugPolicyUK: Ofgem announced a 4% rise in the domestic energy price cap for 1 October to 31 December 2026, which it attributed to higher wholesale gas prices linked to the conflict in the Middle East. Ofgem said the VAT removal kept electricity bills broadly stable, while gas bills rose by about 8%. (Ofgem press release, 26 Aug 2026; Uswitch, 26 Aug 2026)
  • 30 AugMilitaryThe US said it struck Iranian rocket launchers on Larak Island that were preparing to fire sea mines into the strait. Iran was reported to have fired missiles at US forces in the UAE and Jordan (NPR; Al Jazeera). This was the first exchange of fire between the two since 29 July. (NPR, 31 Aug 2026; Al Jazeera, 30 Aug 2026; PBS NewsHour, 30 Aug 2026)
September 2026 · 9 events

Related: Gulf cloud-region events and disaster-recovery guidance

2026 so far

What moved and what did not

Measured from February to August 2026 against each index's own history, fuel prices, most freight price indices, and plastics and aluminium prices rose, while UK import and consumer price indices for IT equipment did not. US and euro-area consumer IT prices and UK and US producer prices for computers did rise, and those rises coincide with the rise in memory-chip prices that was under way during 2025 (TrendForce: 4Q25 conventional DRAM contract prices +45-50% quarter on quarter). Record claims compare every window of the same length in each series, including windows that overlap 2026.

Oil and IT prices, February 2026 = 100
80100120140160Jan 25AprJulOctJan 26FebAprJul28 Feb 2026128 Brent (World Bank)118 US PPI: computers115 UK PPI: computers (C262)98 UK import prices: C2698 UK CPI: IT equipment

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Sources: World Bank Pink Sheet (CC BY 4.0); ONS (OGL v3.0); US BLS (public domain; May–August 2026 US PPI provisional). Monthly, not seasonally adjusted.

Oil and the costs around IT, February 2026 = 100
80100120140160180Jan 25AprJulOctJan 26FebAprJul28 Feb 2026189 GB gas system price165 GB electricity system price129 UK diesel pump price128 Brent (World Bank)123 UK import prices: plastics118 UK PPI: aluminium

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Sources: World Bank; ONS; DESNZ (OGL v3.0). The GB system prices are balancing prices from Elexon BMRS data (Contains BMRS data © Elexon Limited copyright and database right 2026), shown for direction only.

SeriesPeriodChange since before the conflictChange on a year earlier
Brent crude (World Bank, monthly average)2026-02 → 2026-08+27.8%+33.3%
UK import prices: crude petroleum (sterling)2026-02 → 2026-08+23.4%+23.0%
UK diesel pump price2026-02 → 2026-08+28.5%+27.7%
GB electricity system (imbalance) price2026-02 → 2026-08+64.6%+83.5%
GB gas system average price (SAP)2026-02 → 2026-08+88.8%+90.2%
UK import prices: plastics in primary forms2026-02 → 2026-08+23.4%+19.7%
UK PPI output: aluminium2026-02 → 2026-08+17.7%+19.6%
UK SPPI: other transport support (incl. freight forwarding)2025 Q4 → 2026 Q2+24.4%+24.9%
UK SPPI: transport and storage2025 Q4 → 2026 Q2+8.0%+9.0%
US import air freight price2026-02 → 2026-08+21.2%+27.0%
UK import prices: C26 computer, electronic and optical2026-02 → 2026-08−1.8%−2.4%
UK CPI 09.1.3: information processing equipment2026-02 → 2026-08−2.1%−2.5%
UK PPI output: C262 computers and peripherals †2026-02 → 2026-08+15.2%+21.3%
US PPI: computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing †2026-02 → 2026-08+18.1%+22.7%
US CPI: computers, peripherals and smart home assistants †2026-02 → 2026-08+9.3%+8.4%
EU27 HICP: information processing equipment †2026-02 → 2026-08+4.6%+7.2%
US import prices: computers, peripherals and semiconductors †2026-02 → 2026-08+13.9%+19.1%
UK SPPI: data processing and hosting2025 Q4 → 2026 Q2+2.7%+1.3%
US PPI: data processing and hosting2026-02 → 2026-08+1.3%+0.3%

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“Before the conflict” is February 2026 for monthly series and 2025 Q4 for quarterly ones. † Memory-sensitive series: their 2026 rises coincide with the rise in memory-chip prices. Full table of 124 series in the 2026 changes CSV.

Related: memory-driven server price rises · memory prices · memory prices and UK hardware · memory prices and purchasing

The long view

Pass-through evidence

To look beyond one episode, the study estimates how each index has moved in the 12 months after changes in the Brent monthly average (World Bank), from 1996 or the start of each series, controlling for seasonality and, for UK and EU series, exchange rates. The same model finds the expected link for fuels, for example UK sterling import prices for crude oil (elasticity +1.040). UK prices for plastics in primary forms, UK aluminium producer prices and 3 of 16 freight and transport price series (US deep-sea and scheduled air freight, UK road freight) also show robust links; US air-freight import price indices, US freight transport arrangement, UK cargo handling and UK sea and coastal freight show no detectable link. Three IT hardware indices show no detectable link, and the main consumer IT indices are too imprecise to rule out a modest one. Correlation is not causation: the estimates describe how prices have moved together, not why.

How much each index has moved in the 12 months after a 10% rise in Brent
-5%-3%-1%+1%+3%+5%+7%+9%+11%change in the index after 12 months per 10% rise in Brent (conservative interval)Oil and fuelUK import prices: crude petroleum (sterling)+10.4%UK diesel pump price+3.2%UK gas oil (red diesel / heating) price+8.0%MaterialsUK import prices: plastics in primary forms+2.2%UK PPI output: plastics in primary forms+1.8%UK PPI output: aluminium+1.9%FreightUS PPI: deep sea freight+2.2%US PPI: scheduled air freight+1.7%UK SPPI: road freight and removals+0.6%UK SPPI: other transport support (incl. freight forwarding)+1.1%US import air freight price-0.2%Business energy (UK)UK non-domestic electricity, all consumers (p/kWh incl. CCL)+2.3%UK non-domestic gas, all consumers+4.8%IT hardware pricesUK import prices: C26 computer, electronic and optical+0.0%UK CPI 09.1.3: information processing equipment+0.3%UK PPI output: C262 computers and peripherals-0.6%US import prices: computers, peripherals and semiconductors+0.2%US PPI: computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing+0.3%US CPI: computers, peripherals and smart home assistants+0.3%EU27 HICP: information processing equipment+0.4%IT servicesUK SPPI: data processing and hosting-0.0%US PPI: data processing and hosting-0.0%BenchmarkUK CPI: all items+0.4%
Robust linkSignificant, not robustNo detectable link (precise)No detectable link (imprecise)

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Cumulative response from a distributed-lag regression with seasonal dummies (and the exchange rate for UK and EU series), Newey-West errors; bars show the conservative interval (95% interval widened by 1.25). Samples from 1996, or the start of each series, to August 2026.

SeriesPer 10% BrentConservative intervalVerdictSample
UK import prices: crude petroleum (sterling)+10.42%+9.55% to +11.30%Robust link1996-01, n=368
UK diesel pump price+3.16%+2.05% to +4.28%Robust link1996-01, n=368
UK gas oil (red diesel / heating) price+7.99%+6.10% to +9.92%Robust link1996-01, n=368
UK import prices: plastics in primary forms+2.21%+0.87% to +3.56%Robust link2009-01, n=212
UK PPI output: plastics in primary forms+1.83%+0.85% to +2.83%Robust link1996-02, n=367
UK PPI output: aluminium+1.85%+0.84% to +2.88%Robust link1996-02, n=367
US PPI: deep sea freight+2.18%+1.02% to +3.36%Robust link1996-01, n=368
US PPI: scheduled air freight+1.68%+0.58% to +2.79%Robust link2004-01, n=272
UK SPPI: road freight and removals+0.61%+0.05% to +1.17%Robust link2009 Q1, n=70
UK SPPI: other transport support (incl. freight forwarding)+1.14%−0.06% to +2.36%Significant, not robust1996 Q2, n=121
US import air freight price−0.22%−4.24% to +3.96%No detectable link (imprecise)2006-01, n=246
UK non-domestic electricity, all consumers (p/kWh incl. CCL)+2.34%+0.72% to +3.99%Significant, not robust2004 Q2, n=88
UK non-domestic gas, all consumers+4.80%+1.85% to +7.84%Robust link2004 Q2, n=88
UK import prices: C26 computer, electronic and optical+0.04%−0.50% to +0.58%No detectable link (precise)2009-01, n=212
UK CPI 09.1.3: information processing equipment+0.32%−1.40% to +2.08%No detectable link (imprecise)1996-01, n=368
UK PPI output: C262 computers and peripherals−0.55%−2.31% to +1.24%No detectable link (imprecise)1996-02, n=367
US import prices: computers, peripherals and semiconductors+0.19%−0.30% to +0.69%No detectable link (precise)1996-01, n=366
US PPI: computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing+0.30%−0.25% to +0.85%No detectable link (precise)1996-01, n=368
US CPI: computers, peripherals and smart home assistants+0.27%−1.08% to +1.64%No detectable link (imprecise)1998-01, n=342
EU27 HICP: information processing equipment+0.37%−0.29% to +1.03%No detectable link (imprecise)2014-01, n=152
UK SPPI: data processing and hosting−0.03%−0.31% to +0.25%No detectable link (precise)2009 Q1, n=70
US PPI: data processing and hosting−0.04%−0.18% to +0.09%No detectable link (precise)2001-01, n=308
UK CPI: all items+0.36%+0.05% to +0.66%Robust link1996-01, n=368

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Correlation is not causation: these estimates measure how each index has moved after changes in oil, controlling for the exchange rate, and do not separate oil from demand, memory prices, tariffs or product mix. All 93 regressions are in the pass-through CSV; oil-shock episode responses in the episodes CSV.

Freight and trade

Freight and trade

Several freight price indices rose in 2026. UK producer prices for other transport support services, which include freight forwarding (SPPI H5229), rose 23.9% in 2026 Q2 on the previous quarter, and US import air-freight prices rose 21.2% from February to August 2026. HMRC data show that between 47.5% and 67.9% of UK IT import value arrived by air in 2025, and that 0.95% was dispatched from the six GCC states (a lower bound: HMRC records the country of dispatch, not origin).

HS codeGoodsBy air, 2026-Jan-Jul (bounds)By air, 2026-Mar-Jul (bounds)
8471Computers and units (automatic data-processing machines)44.7% (38.2%–52.9%)45.3% (38.9%–52.9%)
8473Parts and accessories of computers and office machines69.3% (69.0%–69.4%)67.7% (67.4%–67.8%)
8517Telephone sets incl. smartphones; network and data-transmission apparatus60.5% (49.1%–67.9%)59.2% (47.7%–67.0%)
8523Storage media incl. solid-state (flash/SSD) devices57.7% (56.5%–58.6%)58.6% (57.2%–59.6%)
8542Electronic integrated circuits77.0% (76.5%–77.1%)77.5% (77.1%–77.6%)
ALLAll five IT headings combined (8471, 8473, 8517, 8523, 8542)54.8% (46.9%–61.3%)54.3% (46.6%–60.8%)

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Between 47.5% and 67.9% of UK IT import value arrived by air in 2025 (59.7% of the value with a verified mode), against 33.2% for all goods. For IT goods dispatched from outside the EU the verified air share was 84.4% (bounds 58.6% to 89.2%). Mode is recorded at the UK border. Source: HMRC Overseas Trade Statistics (OGL v3.0), Servnet calculation. “Verified” counts only value with a recorded port or location; bounds allocate the unverified value entirely to other modes or to air. Goods dispatched from the six GCC states were 0.95% of UK IT import value in 2025 and 0.73% in January–July 2026 (dispatch country, a lower bound on Gulf origin).

Related: supply-chain timing

Supply chain

Materials and Gulf exposure

The Gulf supplies materials used in IT hardware: on USGS estimates, Bahrain and the UAE produced 5.8% of the world's primary aluminium in 2025, and Qatar 33% of its helium. UK import prices for plastics in primary forms rose 23.4% and UK aluminium producer prices 17.7% from February to August 2026. The GCC-dispatched share of UK unwrought aluminium imports by weight (a lower bound) fell to 15.3% in April and 14.2% in June 2026, the lowest since June 2023, before returning to 28.4% in July (2025: 31.0%; 2023-25 monthly range 12-47%).

ExposureValueMeasureYearSource
Oil through the Strait of Hormuz20.3million barrels per day (2024 average; EIA describes this as about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption)2024EIA, Today in Energy, 16 June 2025 (figure data; analysis based on Vortexa)
Oil through the Strait of Hormuz (share of seaborne trade)more than one-quartershare of total global seaborne oil trade (2024 and 1Q25)2024EIA, Today in Energy, 16 June 2025
LNG through the Strait of Hormuz20.0percent of global LNG trade (2024); Qatar ~9.3 Bcf/d and UAE ~0.7 Bcf/d2024EIA, Today in Energy, 24 June 2025
Destination of Hormuz crude84.0percent of Hormuz crude and condensate going to Asian markets (China, India, Japan and South Korea together 69%)2024EIA, Today in Energy, 16 June 2025
Destination of Hormuz LNG83.0percent of Hormuz LNG going to Asian markets (China, India and South Korea together 52%)2024EIA, Today in Energy, 24 June 2025
LNG via Hormuz delivered to Taiwan0.78billion cubic feet per day (2024)2024EIA figure data, Today in Energy 24 June 2025 (Vortexa-based)
LNG via Hormuz delivered to South Korea1.21billion cubic feet per day (2024)2024EIA figure data, Today in Energy 24 June 2025 (Vortexa-based)
LNG via Hormuz delivered to China2.45billion cubic feet per day (2024)2024EIA figure data, Today in Energy 24 June 2025 (Vortexa-based)
Hormuz bypass pipeline capacity2.60million barrels per day of Saudi and UAE pipeline capacity estimated available to bypass Hormuz2025EIA, Today in Energy, 16 June 2025
Japan crude oil: Middle East dependence94.0percent of crude imports from the Middle East (Hormuz-routed: 93.0%)2025METI/ANRE, 27 March 2026 briefing (from Ministry of Finance trade statistics)
Japan LNG: Middle East dependence10.8percent of LNG imports from the Middle East (Hormuz-routed: 6.3%, about 4 million tonnes of 64.98 million tonnes)2025METI/ANRE, 27 March 2026 briefing (from Ministry of Finance trade statistics)
South Korea crude oil: Middle East dependence69.1percent of crude imports (volume) from the Middle East (2024: 71.52%)2025Korea National Oil Corporation, "Domestic crude oil imports by country" (Korea Public Data Portal dataset 15054606, data.go.kr; derived by Servnet)
Taiwan crude oil: Middle East producers69.6percent of crude imports (volume) from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Iraq, Qatar and Oman (excluding Oman: 61.71%)2025Taiwan Energy Administration, MOEA (derived by Servnet)
Taiwan LNG: Qatar share33.0percent of Taiwan LNG imports from Qatar (Australia 34%, US 10%)2025EIA Taiwan Analysis Brief, April 2026 (Vortexa data)
Taiwan natural gas safety stock (statutory)11.0days of statutory gas safety stock (2025), rising to 14 days from 20272025Taiwan MOEA Energy Administration
China crude oil via Hormuz43.1percent of China crude imports that transited Hormuz (4.78 of 11.1 million b/d)2024EIA (Hormuz destinations: Today in Energy 16 June 2025; China imports: Today in Energy 11 Feb 2025) - derived by Servnet
Helium: Qatar share of world production33.2percent of world helium production (63 of 190 million m3; 2024: 34.97%, 64 of 183)2025USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (derived by Servnet)
Helium: Qatar share of US helium imports28.0percent of US helium imports from Qatar, 2021-24 (Canada 47%)2021-2024USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026
Helium: Qatar resources10.1billion cubic metres of identified helium resources in Qatar - the largest outside the US (world ex-US 31.3)2025USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026
Helium: UK imports dispatched from the Gulf14.4percent of UK helium import value dispatched from GCC states (Qatar alone: 4.31%)2025HMRC Overseas Trade Statistics (derived by Servnet)
Primary aluminium: Bahrain and UAE share of world smelter production5.81percent of world primary aluminium smelter production, 2025 estimate (Bahrain 1,600 + UAE 2,700 of 74,000 thousand tonnes). Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman are not listed separately by USGS (they sit inside "Other countries"), so this understates the GCC total.2025U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, Aluminum (derived by Servnet)
Primary aluminium: UK imports dispatched from the Gulf31.0percent of UK unwrought aluminium imports by weight (net mass, HS 7601) dispatched from GCC states2025HMRC Overseas Trade Statistics (derived by Servnet)
Primary aluminium: US import sources12.0percent of US aluminium imports from UAE (8%) and Bahrain (4%), 2021-242021-2024USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026
Sulfur: Gulf share of world production23.8percent of world sulfur production from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and Iran (GCC four only: 21.31%)2025USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (derived by Servnet)
Polyethylene and polypropylene: UK imports dispatched from the Gulf6.05percent of UK PE + PP import mass (HS 3901-3902) dispatched from GCC states2025HMRC Overseas Trade Statistics (derived by Servnet)

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Why each matters for IT, and each source link, are in the JSON dataset (exposure). USGS and EIA figures are US public domain; HMRC shares are Servnet calculations from OGL data and count dispatch country, so Gulf shares are lower bounds.

Running IT

Energy and running costs

Wholesale energy prices rose in 2026: the GB electricity system price by 64.6% and the GB gas system average price by 88.8% from February to August. The latest DESNZ business electricity prices, for 2026 Q1 (which includes only one month after the conflict began), show little change, and 2026 Q2 prices are due on 29 September 2026. The running-cost figures are illustrative arithmetic, not a quote or forecast, and use the DESNZ price band that matches the load.

Load (illustrative)DESNZ bandkWh a year2025 Q42026 Q12025 averageBand recordPer +1p/kWh
10 kW rack, PUE 1.58Small (20-499 MWh/yr)138,408£40,927£39,800£40,266£47,850£1,384
2-socket server at median idle (173.4 W), PUE 1.58Small (20–499 MWh/yr)2,400£710£690£698£830£24
Each 100 W of continuous load, PUE 1.58Small (20–499 MWh/yr)1,384£409£398£403£479£14
10 kW rack, PUE 1.58Small (20–499 MWh/yr)138,408£33,202£33,414£33,687£39,292£1,384
10 kW rack, PUE 1.58Small (20–499 MWh/yr)138,408£29,243£29,649£29,590£32,205£1,384
Each 100 W of continuous load, PUE undefinedSmall (20–499 MWh/yr)NaN£NaN£NaN£NaN£NaN£NaN

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Illustrative arithmetic on sourced inputs, not a measurement or quote: annual cost (GBP) = watts x 8,760 h / 1,000 x PUE x price (p/kWh) / 100 Prices are DESNZ Quarterly Energy Prices table 3.4.2, non-domestic electricity including the Climate Change Levy (OGL v3.0); 2026 Q2 prices are due on 29 September 2026. Idle power is the ENERGY STAR median for 2-socket rack servers (a floor: working servers draw more); PUE 1.58 is the Uptime Institute 2023 industry average.

Related: worked running-cost example (same DESNZ tables) · calculate your own load · rack power planning

For IT budget holders

What this means for IT budgets

These data show where IT costs have moved with oil and where they have not. Organisations planning IT budgets can check when their energy contracts renew and which DESNZ price band their sites fall into. They can review freight, fuel-surcharge and delivery terms on hardware orders. They can budget memory-sensitive items, such as servers, storage and SSDs, separately from energy and freight costs. And they can test recovery plans for any workloads hosted in the affected Gulf cloud regions. None of this is a forecast or advice on when to buy.

Related: budget planning steps · refresh planning · cost comparison

Method

How the study was built

How these figures were produced

  • Oil price: the World Bank Pink Sheet monthly average of Brent. The pre-conflict baseline is 2026-02 (the conflict began on 28 February 2026); December 2025 is used as a sensitivity baseline because February already included a risk premium.
  • dln(Y_t) = a + seasonal dummies + sum_{k=0..12} b_k dln(Brent_{t-k}) [+ sum_{k=0..12} c_k dln(FX_{t-k}) for UK and EU series] + e_t, monthly; quarterly series use 0..4 quarterly lags. Brent in US dollars (World Bank monthly average, quarterly mean for quarterly series); FX = US dollars per pound (UK) or per euro (EU), Federal Reserve H.10. Cumulative elasticity = sum of b_k. Newey-West (Bartlett) HAC standard errors with 12 monthly / 4 quarterly lags, small-sample factor n/(n-k); 95% CI = estimate +/- 1.96 SE. Dependent-variable sample from 1996-01 or the series start. Robustness: sample ending 2026-02 (pre-conflict) and sample starting 2010-01. Benjamini-Hochberg q-values across all main-sample regressions. HAC intervals are somewhat narrow in finite samples: in Servnet Monte Carlo checks of this exact design (13 Brent lags, HAC lag 12, n = 220-360, AR(1) errors with coefficient 0 to 0.7) nominal 95% intervals covered the true value 88-93% of the time and the empirical 95th percentile of |t| was 2.28-2.44, i.e. up to 1.25 x 1.96; verdicts therefore use a conservative interval widened by 1.25. Residual first-order autocorrelation is reported for each regression.
  • A month t is flagged when the Brent monthly average (World Bank) moves by at least 1.25 standard deviations of 6-month log changes (SD calibrated on 1990-01 to 2025-12 = 0.2589; threshold 0.3236 log points, i.e. a rise of 38.2% or a fall of 27.6%) between t and the most extreme month in t+1..t+6. Consecutive flagged months moving in the same direction and no more than 3 months apart form one episode; its baseline is the flagged month with the largest move. Named historical episodes are the flagged episodes whose baselines fall in stated windows. June 2025 and the 2026 conflict are event-dated using the checked timeline.
  • Trade: HMRC Overseas Trade Statistics bulk import files, January 2019 to July 2026, HS 8471, 8473, 8517, 8523 and 8542; mode of transport at the UK border, counted only where a port or location is recorded, with bounds.
  • Timeline: every event has at least two independent sources, was checked by a second reviewer, and is described neutrally without casualty figures; attacks are attributed only as the parties or official bodies reported them.
  • Checks: two rounds of independent verification re-downloaded the sources and recomputed the results with separate code (about 60,000 values compared, none wrong in the final round), reviewed every sentence for accuracy and neutral wording, and checked every source licence. A self-check script recomputes every number on this page from the dataset before release.
All caveats (30)
  • Correlation is not causation. The regressions measure how index changes have co-moved with earlier changes in the World Bank Brent monthly average; they do not isolate the effect of oil from demand cycles, exchange rates, memory-chip prices, tariffs or product mix.
  • Brent is measured as the World Bank monthly average of daily spot prices, the only Brent series charted or published in the CSV files. The Europe Brent spot price FOB (EIA, daily; upstream Refinitiv), futures settlements and intraday highs quoted in news reports are different measures and are not comparable.
  • The 2026 episode is short: monthly indices have +3 and +6 month readings (to August 2026) and quarterly indices one or two post-outbreak quarters. No +12 month reading exists yet.
  • The 2026 baseline is February 2026, the last full pre-conflict month; EIA attributes the January-February 2026 rise in front-month Brent futures to conflict risk (EIA Today in Energy, 7 Apr 2026). December 2025 is shown as a sensitivity baseline.
  • Single-month endpoints can mislead for volatile monthly indices (for example UK CPI 09.1.3 and the CPI item segments), so year-on-year changes and three-month averages are reported beside them.
  • A rise in memory-chip (DRAM/NAND) prices was under way during 2025 (TrendForce: 4Q25 conventional DRAM contract prices +45-50% quarter on quarter) and overlaps the 2026 conflict. The vendor statements and filings reviewed cite memory and component costs, and none gives oil or energy as a reason for price increases. Memory-sensitive series are flagged.
  • US tariff actions (2025-26) changed the price of some imported goods; computers, parts, smartphones, SSDs and chips were largely exempted, but not all electronics.
  • CPI indices for PCs, laptops, tablets and smartphones are quality-adjusted (hedonic), so they measure constant-quality prices, not shelf prices.
  • ONS PPI and SPPI were corrected in October 2025 after a chain-linking error and are currently "official statistics" rather than accredited; July-August 2026 PPI is provisional. US PPI from May 2026 is preliminary.
  • Percentage changes computed from index levels published to one decimal place can differ by about 0.1 percentage point from rates published by ONS. Every percentage in the text is rounded once, from the unrounded value.
  • Record and "largest since" statements compare the current move with every other window of the same length in the series, including windows that overlap it or began before the baseline.
  • CPI item-level (consumption segment) series are Servnet chain-links of non-accredited, small-sample ONS indices; use for direction only.
  • DESNZ non-domestic electricity prices end at Q1 2026 (provisional), which contains only one conflict month (March). Q2 2026 is due on 29 September 2026. Many businesses are on fixed-price contracts, so wholesale moves reach them with a lag.
  • The 2021-23 lag between wholesale and business electricity prices is one episode, affected by government support schemes (EBRS, EBDS); it is a historical observation, not a forecast.
  • The GB electricity system price is an imbalance price, not the forward or day-ahead price business contracts track.
  • The running-cost model is illustrative arithmetic, not a quote or forecast. Measured idle power is a floor and the PSU rating a ceiling; real draw lies between and depends on workload. PUE figures are industry averages from 2023. DESNZ price bands depend on the whole site's consumption.
  • HMRC mode of transport is the mode at the UK border: goods trucked from EU hubs appear as road/ro-ro even if they left Asia by sea or air. 20-43% of non-EU IT import value in most months has no verified mode; bounds are reported, and "most" is not used unless the lower bound exceeds 50%.
  • HMRC records the country of dispatch, not origin, so Gulf shares of UK imports are lower bounds. Aluminium and polymer shares are by weight (net mass).
  • EIA 2026 Hormuz and Malacca flow volumes are EIA estimates; EIA says ship-tracking data have been unreliable since late February 2026. EIA's Malacca Table 3 and Table 2 give different 2025 Q4 values (24.0 and 24.9 million b/d).
  • Hormuz transit counts come from JMIC advisories (single facts); IMF PortWatch was not used because its terms do not allow redistribution in a CC BY dataset, and counts from proprietary trackers are not reproduced.
  • EIA spot-price series (Brent, WTI, jet fuel) are EIA-published with an upstream source of Refinitiv (LSEG); redistribution is pending EIA confirmation. They are used in the analysis, but their observations are not published in the JSON or the CSV files; only derived statistics and single dated facts are quoted.
  • Bank of England exchange-rate series were not used because some are excluded from its open licence; Federal Reserve (USD/GBP, USD/EUR) and ECB (GBP/EUR) rates are used instead.
  • US CPI and import price values for October 2025 were not published (US government shutdown); affected monthly changes are dropped, not filled.
  • Eurostat HICP moved to ECOICOP 2 in 2026: information processing equipment is CP0813 (2025=100); the old CP0913 series ended in December 2025.
  • The regressions test many indices; Benjamini-Hochberg q-values are reported to limit false discoveries. Individual significant results among many tests should be read with care.
  • Residual first-order autocorrelation (residualRho1, the Pearson correlation of consecutive regression residuals) reaches about 0.5-0.62 (to 2 dp) for 6 of 93 regressions (maximum ESTAT_HICP_CP0813_EA_I25); Newey-West standard errors allow for this, and the conservative interval widens them further.
  • US freight producer price series (deep-sea freight, scheduled air freight, freight arrangement) and the BLS inbound air-freight index use their full BLS history (re-downloaded 19 Sep 2026); regressions start in 1996-01 or at the series start.
  • UK CPI observations before 1996 are ONS back-series estimates, not official CPI outturns; the regressions start in 1996.
  • Newey-West intervals can be too narrow in finite samples; verdicts use intervals widened by 1.25 (see method).
  • Nothing here is a forecast of oil, energy, freight or IT prices, or investment advice, and third-party forecasts are not reproduced. The study is neutral on the conflict and reports no casualty figures.

Servnet's derived statistics and compilation: CC BY 4.0. Each third-party series keeps its own licence, given in the licence and attribution columns. ECB values are unmodified and may not be modified. BMRS-derived values carry the Elexon attribution requirement. Credit “Servnet, Oil prices and the cost of IT 2026”. Downloads: all series (CSV) · 2026 changes · pass-through · episodes · licences and attributions · JSON.

FAQ

Questions

Has the 2026 conflict involving Iran made computers more expensive in the UK?

Not on the official UK import and consumer price indices. From February to August 2026 UK import prices for computer, electronic and optical products changed −1.8%, and UK consumer prices for information processing equipment were 2.5% lower in August than a year earlier, while the Brent monthly average (World Bank) rose 27.8%. UK producer prices for computers and peripherals rose 15.2%, coinciding with the rise in memory-chip prices.

Why are computer prices going up in 2026?

Where computer prices have risen in 2026, the rises coincide with the rise in memory-chip prices that was under way during 2025: Raspberry Pi said in October 2025 that memory then cost about 120% more than a year earlier. TrendForce reported that conventional DRAM contract prices rose about 93-98% quarter on quarter in the first quarter of 2026 (press release, 1 June 2026). The vendor statements and filings reviewed, including those of HP, HPE, Dell and Cisco, cite memory and component costs; none gives oil or energy as a reason for price increases.

Do oil prices affect computer prices?

Not detectably, in these data. Over samples starting in 1996 (2009 for UK C26 import prices), three IT hardware price indices show no link with earlier changes in the World Bank Brent monthly average larger than about a 1% move per 10% Brent move, while fuel prices, UK prices for plastics in primary forms, UK aluminium producer prices and 3 of 16 freight and transport price series show a robust link. For the main consumer IT price indices the data cannot rule out a modest link, and correlation is not causation.

How has the conflict affected energy prices for UK businesses?

Wholesale prices rose: the GB electricity system price by 64.6% and the GB gas system average price by 88.8% from February to August 2026. The latest official business prices, for 2026 Q1 (which includes only one month after the conflict began), were little changed (24.14p/kWh on average against 23.99p in 2025 Q4), and DESNZ publishes 2026 Q2 prices on 29 September 2026. In 2021-23 the average business price peaked five quarters after the wholesale system price (4-6 quarters across the size bands from Small to Extra Large); that was one episode and is not a forecast.

Is the helium supply disruption affecting chips?

Qatar produced about 33% of the world's helium in 2025 (USGS estimate), and QatarEnergy said the damage at Ras Laffan in March 2026 removed output equal to about 14% of Qatar's helium exports. This study does not measure chip prices by input, so it cannot show whether that has affected chip prices. UK helium imports dispatched from Qatar are small and irregular: Qatar was the dispatch country for 4.3% of UK helium import value in 2025, and there were ten months with none in 2024.

Were AWS data centres in the Gulf affected?

Yes. AWS reported that objects struck a facility in its UAE Region on 1 March 2026, and that drone strikes affected facilities in the UAE and Bahrain. On 15 September 2026 AWS said it could not restore data held only in its Bahrain Region (me-south-1) or only in one UAE zone (mec1-az2). Organisations with workloads there can follow AWS guidance and test recovery into other Regions.

How much of the UK's IT imports come from the Gulf?

Little directly: 0.95% of UK IT import value in 2025 was dispatched from the six Gulf Cooperation Council states (0.73% in January-July 2026). HMRC records the country of dispatch, not origin, so this is a lower bound, and goods that pass through Gulf air hubs keep their original dispatch country.

What can IT buyers do with this?

Plan with the evidence rather than a forecast: check energy contract renewal dates and your DESNZ price band, review freight and surcharge terms on hardware orders, budget memory-sensitive items separately from energy and freight, and test disaster recovery for any workloads in affected cloud regions. This study does not forecast prices and does not recommend when to buy.

Related

Planning IT costs

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